ghandi
THE EVOLUTION OF PARTY SYSTEM IN INDIAThe party system in India has changed from time to time. In the beginning, it was a one party dominant system, briefly a two-party system, and subsequently a multiparty system moving two words chaos with no semblance of a 'system'. Party politics in India has passed through different phases of development characterized as follows: (1) Congress System (1952-67) (2) coalition model (1967-71) (3) second one party dominant model (1971-77) (4) second correlation model (1977-79) (5) third one party dominant model (1980-89) (6) multiparty system (1989 onwards).Congress System (1952-1967)From 1952 to 1967, the peculiar party system generally described as the one party dominant system prevailed in India as only the Congress was voted time and again with an overwhelming parliamentary majority on plurality (not majority) of votes in democratically contested elections. It coincided with the premiership of Nehru, Shastri and pre-1969 in the Indira Gandhi.It was based on a peculiar pattern of government-opposition relationship that produced a party system with difference and provided and interesting alternative to other existing party system. Robert Dahl puts India into the category of nations which have a party system with one normally dominant government party that gains close to 50% of the popular votes and a lot more seats in the parliament with the opposition fragmented in three or more parties. Here was a paradox of a party getting majority of seats with minority of popular votes the cause of the fragmentation of opposition votes. Rajni Kothari described it thus:It is a system in which a historically dominant party is opposed by a large number of parties and factional groupings that are dispersed throughout the country, the role of the dominant party has been to evolve a consensus on both normative and procedural matters as well as major policy issues. In such a system, the dominant party becomes a norm setter for all other parties and the model set by the Congress had in fact been spreading both in terms of policies and programmes. In this system it is the dominant party that acts as an aggregation by developing into a comprehensive, representative mechanism, it represents all shades of opinion, all major interest groups in the society and indeed all other parties as well.Ideologically, the Congress took root and came to political power not as a party but as a movement for independence and reform. Secondly, from the beginning the Congress was committed to a democratic ideology. Thirdly, the comprehensive and authoritative organization of the Congress party provided the basis for bidding community and national leadership under Nehru who symbolized the unity and progress of the nation. Historical reasons are necessary but not sufficient for the efficacy of the system. There is no doubt that in its character and depth, the Congress was unparalleled movement for independence, and this had significantly contributed to its place in India. Nehru's charismatic personality was described by his critics as a "banyan tree" under which independent leaders could not grow. In the same way the Congress was described as an "umbrella" with no scope for other parties to stake claims to independent bases of support.The first general elections, under Nehru's direct stewardship, attracted worldwide interest. The Congress, by virtue of its being a pioneer in the freedom struggle, became an increasingly effective election winning machine. The people returned Congress candidates in impressive numbers. In 18 out of 22 state assemblies the Congress had absolute majorities. All the opposition parties put together a secured and 125 seats, that is, 25.6% of the total but in terms of token votes cast it was as much as 55%.The second general election in 1957 came at a time when Nehru's influence and power was at it's the zenith, and before various economic, political and internal troubles assumed critical proportions. The Congress occupied 365 seats in Lok Sabha there as the next largest party, the Communists, occupied only 34, and the Independents numbered only 135. This impregnable position of the Congress is largely attributed to Nehru's immense popularity among the masses.In the years preceding the 1962 election there were signs of factional strife within the Congress party which endangered the chances of success of candidates representing the Congress. In a number of states, Congress factions fought each other under the very nose of the High Command. The leadership of the Congress party faced for the first time an position which was very vociferous in criticizing its politices.The formation of the Swantrata party in 1959 represented an effort on part of some of India's most distinguished public figures to build 'non-leftist' opposition to the ruling Congress party. The third Lok Sabha elections in 1962 came at the time in Indochinese relations deteriorated abruptly and the country faced serious economic difficulties. The post-Nehru elections put on a different character, because the great leader, who had lost public esteem because of a defeat in Indochina war, was no longer at the helm. Lal Bahadur Shastri succeeded Nehru. The syndicate played the critical role and in coalescing the diverse interests behind Shastri and in securing consensus within the party. He knew that his stature was considered to be less than his illustrious predecessor. In January 1966, within two or years after he had assumed the office, Shastri died. The syndicate chose Indira Gandhi as the Prime Minister.The first three general elections were won by the Congress party with massive mandates because of following reasons:(a) There was the charismatic leadership Nehru which acquired the form of personality cult. During the greater part of the Nehru era, complacency had creeped in the Congress which made it reluctant to provide for the development for the essentials to stabilization of democracy. It entertained the firm belief that it was irreplaceable force and could retain power through cleverly managed permutations and combinations.(ii) As Rajni Kothari says, in the "Congress System" the Congress had organizations at the grass-roots level which helped in assessing the interests and requirements of the masses. The politics of India operated at two levels - traditional and modern - and the party which had the capacity of combining both had better prospects of electoral success. In this respect the Congress was most apt because of the leading role it played during the struggle for independence. Besides, this provided it enormous legitimacy.(iii) During the first three elections, the success of the Congress was partly explained by the splitting of the opposition votes. Since the opposition to the Congress mainly obtained from the divisions in the same elite groups, their future policies and perceptions of the problems were the same. They could not emerge as a better alternative to the Congress, but act merely as "parties of pressure". Thus, these elections were conducted and fought in the framework of an established and stable one-party dominant system.The main features of the first model were intra-party competition within the Congress Party, based on a historical of consensus, and the role of opposition as a pressure group. The Congress party was successful in evolving a national consensus. The party system was oriented to conflict avoidance and group accommodation even at the cost of ideological coherence and effectiveness of performances.This model is characterized as the locality oriented pluralist model marked by a complex multi-layered functional and party political structures which were locally articulated along cost, community and the factional lines in villages and districts and aggregated at the state level and an by reasonably autonomous sets of a party elites in various states. This was a period of "consociational" dominance by the Congress party ruling with overwhelming majorities in the parliament and almost all the state legislatures. All the three general elections held in 1952, 1957 and 1962 adhered to the abovementioned model. The 1967 one in particular held after Nehru's demise broadly conforms to this model.Coalition model (1967-1971)The fourth general election was qualitatively different from the previous three elections for the following reasons:(i) In the first general elections, Nehru was a great mobilizer of votes for the Congress, while other political parties lacked such a one. On the plane of leadership, competition among these political parties was on an unequal basis. Death of Nehru meant that at the level of leadership or national political parties stood, by and large, on an equal footing in their respective zones of influence. Indira Gandhi (initially), S.A. Dange, E.M.S. Namboodiraoad, Atal Behari Vajpayee, and Dr. Ram Manohar Lohia, were leaders of more or less equal stature.(ii) The dominance of the Congress during the first three general elections typified more a renewal of confidence in the Congress rule than a genuine competition among the political parties for capturing power. The fourth general election, on the other hand, brought into prominence formidable claimants for power. The Congress party faced the fourth general elections with certain liabilities, by the position of the opposition parties had somewhat improved. The public image of the Congress had been tarnished owing to the charges of corruption against it, and also on account of growing economic crisis in the country. Intra-party conflicts and the role of the bosses weakened the party, dissidents and splinter groups moved of the from the Congress in the form of Jana Congress in Bengal, Madhya Pradesh, Orissa, Jana Kranti Dal in Bihar; Jana Paksha in Mysore; and the Jana Party in Rajashthan.(iii) During the first three elections, the Congress victory was partly explained by the splitting of the opposition that vote. At the time of the fourth general elections, the opposition parties therefore, used the strategy of forming united fronts to avoid conflicts among themselves. Other important factors which influence the voters at the time of the fourth general elections were the growing economic crisis, the socialist path of development followed by the Congress, sharpening of social conflicts, devaluation of the Indian rupee, failure of the government's economic and political parties, famine in Bihar, stunted growth, growing discontentment among large sections of people, rising prices, prospering of the niche as a result of benefits accruing from the three five-year plans. Added to these was the sensitive issue of cow slaughter. In this atmosphere, the opposition parties were preparing themselves for "opposing, exposing and disposing" the Congress party from power.In view of the above changes in the national climate, and the capacity of the opposition parties to shore and effective challenge to the Congress, the capitalists also changed their strategy. For them financing the party elections is an investment for future returns. At the time of the fourth general elections, some of the capitalists turned towards other political parties also and contributed to the election expenditure, while some industrial houses like the Birlas continued to finance the Congress. The voters, at the time of the fourth general elections, did not take heed of the advice of the defenders from the Congress System, and exercise their franchise with a sense of discrimination.So 1967 was a watershed in Indian elections in a true sense. For the first time a challenge was posed to the ruling party and seemingly its support base was on the decline. The Congress thus faced the danger of being reduced to a minority party. Aboard a rise a Xiong of politics through radicalization of certain sections of Indian voters also began with the 1967 elections.The decline of the Congress, apart from bringing about a change in its numerical position, left a tremendous impact on the institutional setup of the whole political system. To start with, and the Congress wave swept the 1967 election for the first time in the post independence period. The dominance of the party in parliament too was reduced. Added to this, the formation of non-congress coalition governments in some north Indian states had a considerable impact on the nature of federation. Above all, the Congress is faced with leadership problems during the period 1967-69. During this time there was no leader who commanded undisputed loyalty. This period was passed marked by India's transition from a dominant party system to a system of competitive sharing of power.The 1967 elections underscored two factors:(i) A large number of voters expressed their deep dissatisfaction at the poor performance of the Congress and the government officials on several fronts, and(ii) There was a widespread opposition sentiment against the establishment which was then identified with the Congress party.This dissatisfaction led to a decline in Congress voters and strengthening of political forces both of them left and right, indicating radicalization of Indian politics. Thus, the fourth general elections replaced the Congress party with a coalition or other parties, in at least half of the states.Several political analysts observed that with the 1967 elections and 1969 splits in the Congress party, the system of dominant party had come to an end. According to Kothari, the 1967 elections "put the Congress System on trial" and marked the end of one party dominance system in India. A national precedent was established that non-congress parties could win and form governments. The election also "brought to an end the real of Congress dominance. Iqbal Narain remark that this country was then passing through an essentially transitional period of political polarization. Angela Berger described it as a part in which moved from "one-party dominance to moderately competent if multiparty system".The year 1967 therefore should be seen more as a period of transition caused by the erosion of the Congress System and its ability to contain divergent forces within its ranks and produce some sort of a consensus. In the articulation of this transition from the Congress System to a more fragmented political system, mobilization of popular discontent played an important role. Stanley Kochanek noted, "the 1967 general election marked the beginning of the transformation of the Indian political system from a dominant one party system to a multiparty system".Thus, the 1967 election represented a major step in the direction of and increasingly competitive polity.All said and done, the Congress was still in how are both at the centre and in other states. It was still a force to reckon with and the most important party in the Indian party system. The dominant party system could not be taken for granted after 1967.The second phase of the party system was a brief interlude of multiparty some configuration following the 1969 Congress split between the Indira faction and the syndicate faction when the Indira Gandhi government was reduced to a minority status and survived with the support extended by leftist and regional parties from outside. Thus, the second phase in the party system was a brief interlude of minority government politics.But the 1967 elections and the split did not alter the Indian party system in a significant way and the one party dominant system, as stated by Kothari did not come to an end. In fact, as W.H. Morris Jones observes, only a decline of the Congress dominance during 1967-71 took place and India appeared to be developing her own chaotic form of multi-party politics. The nature of electoral support the Congress received in 1967 in terms of percentage of seats (if not of the popular votes) determined that he was given the largest political party. Though it lost in quantity, yet qualitatively the support for the Congress in 1967 came almost evenly from all the religions and from the various demographic, socio-economic and ethnic categories in the population. A sharp decline in the size of its support indeed indicated reduction in the strength and spread of the party, but not so much dismantling of the structure of its dominance.What had changed was the environment around the grand old party. The elected it was one generation removed from the event of independence. The old, charismatic leadership of the independence movement had departed from the scene. A large number of young voters (who lacked a sense of commitment to the Congress) had entered the electorate. New alliances of interests had begun to emerge in politics, marked by accruing politicization of vast numbers of the middle and lower peasantry and the middle cast groups. This led to a large scale differentiation of the electorate, the diverse party identification based on new interests and ideological alignments. If the party remained cut off from these developments, its dominance, say, its very existence as a national party, was jeopardy.Indira Gandhi's performance this sometime after 1967 was rather unimpressive, if not positively bad. As the dessert, the 1967 elections saw the Congress suffer public humiliation and it went out of power in quite a few states. Apprehensive of the worsening image of their party, the Congress leaders persuaded Morarji Desai to hold the office of the Deputy Prime Minister under Indira Gandhi and. This make-shift to arrangement, however, could not last long. Indira Gandhi felt constrained in the company of Desai and determined to get rid of him and also of the Congress leadership which was not allowing her a free hand. This leadership was now in a state of disarray. Most of them had lost in the 1967 elections. S.K. Patil, Kamaraj and Atulya Ghosh no longer appeared to Indira Gandhi as invincible giants.To attain her objective of retaining power, Indira Gandhi used Machiavellian strategy and tactics. To discredit the syndicate leaders in the party and to project herself as a progressive leader she used radical slogans. She did not hesitate to confront the Congress leadership on a number of issues and went ahead with the nationalization of 14 private banks despite finance minister Morarji Desai's reservation on the issue. Further, she also divested him of the finance portfolio as a consequence of which he quit the cabinet. The privy purses which were being paid to the former princes were also abolished. The old leadership, which was not very enthusiastic about these steps, was effectively portrayed as reactionary, conservative and supporter of the haves as against the have-nots. After President Zakir Husain's death, Indira Gandhi in a clever move, instead of opting for syndicate's Sanjeeva Reddy as her successor, supported V.V Giri's candidature which eventually caused a split in the Congress.This went along the way in projecting Indira Gandhi as a dynamic leader, which indeed was considered be helped by the incapacity of the opposition to reap full advantage of the decline in voter support of the Congress party. For instance, the opposition parties failed to capitalize on the propellant and the Congress mood of the people when they came to power in some states and formed coalition governments in 1967 and 1969. They tended to exploit the newly emergent situation for their sectional gains at the expense of their coalition partners, thus rendering the coalitional government weak and ineffective. The common programs evolved by the coalition partners went into flames on account of its lighting and self-aggradizement. By the time the 1971 elections came, the opposition parties were thoroughly discredited.This led to the refurbishment of the image of the new Congress and the emergence of Indira Gandhi as the savior of the poor. The left rhetoric kindled a new ray of hope in the people. Indira Gandhi symbolized the personification of opposition to what the old Congress stood for, to the vested interests in the country and to the policies and programmes that perpetuated social and economic injustices. In this sense, Indira Gandhi rode on the crest of the anti establishment, oppositional wave that had been striking so ineffectively against the Congress bulwark till 1967. She succeeded in translating this oppositional wave into a new channel of electoral support. The 1971 election represented, therefore, the new alignment of voters in favor of the new Congress based on oppositional and radical sentiments.Sensing public support for her policies she decided to go directly to the people and receive a fresh mandate by hoarding midterm poll in 1971. This preempted the development of party system towards a multiparty system and the growth of politics of coalition building at the national level. But at the same time this strategy brought to an end the first phase of the Indian party system. The Congress leadership destroyed the historical organization the Congress System. Indeed the strategy resulted in the established hegemony of the Congress at the center, based on populist politics and plebiscitary election.Second One-Party Dominance Model (1971-77)Did the 1971 parliamentary elections the one party dominant system was restored after a brief interlude of four years, encompassing many features of the pre-1967 era. However, it also included some notable differences and significant modifications of the first phase. A major difference in the new model was the collapse of the competitive mechanism within the dominant party. The Congress split and the emergence of the Indira leadership role the destroyed the balance of internal factional competition. Factional bosses were suppressed and crashed. Such a combination of the monopolistic dominance of the Congress led to a steady erosion of the "openness" of the system, and there emerged an authoritarian concentration of power, resulting ultimately in the imposition of emergency.The second major difference in the new model was the decline of institutionalized politics and the growth of populist style and why the third concerned the articulation of the goals of the system. In the aria dominance model, consensus making by accommodating various interests was itself a critical value; conflict avoidance and group accommodation or press third even at the cost of ideological coherence and effectiveness of performance. But in the new model, economic performance was accorded high priority.Thus, the second dominance model was a model of one-party dominance without the balance of internal competition. Its dial put a premium on the confrontation rather than consensus. This phase was characterized as the model of nationally oriented personalized mass appeal in which the national content of the preceding model became very persuasive. In addition, two of the preceding model's critical features - the autonomous state Congress leadership and locality orientation of the electorate came to be seriously undermined by personalized mass appeal of the national leader by-passing the intermediary structures of power and seeking to "nationalize" political issues. This marked the revival of personality cult manipulated by populist appeal as and media support.However, these differences affected the open and competitive nature of the Indian one party dominant system and led to the transformation of the dominant party system with a highly institutionalized party at its call the dominant party system that the call parties rests primarily upon the capacity of a single leader who enjoys wide public appeal, is without a dominant competition within the party or without.The major characteristics of the new model were: the collapse of competitive mechanism; the decline of institutionalized politics and the growth of populist style; and a clear articulation of the goals of the system.In the 1967 elections the leadership of Indira Gandhi was questioned, but by 1971 she was able to establish the charismatic leadership.Such an important factors molded and greatly influence the political behaviour of Indira Gandhi. To start with, she inherited a rich political legacy and got ample opportunities to understand the political life of India, the leaders of the Congress party and the power dynamics of the nations in the international arena. She lost no opportunity in highlighting the name of Nehru and the Nehru clan out of proportion. Absence of the genuine and powerful leader with a mass appeal and a well organized political party with the mass base to counter her gave a tremendous psychological boost and developed in her a superiority complex vis-a-vis other political forces. Above all and, having tasted power once, she developed a strong last for it. To fulfill her ambition Indira Gandhi went to the extent of using force, fraud, dubious means, tactics of divide and rule and reward and punishment, and playing with the sentiments of the people. She did this very successfully, but, in the process, eroded the base and essence of democracy in India. No force was effective enough to counter the nefarious designs.Regarding Indira Gandhi's relationship with the Congress, the following observations standout prominently: she used the party as dual and to achieve her objectives and completed the process of identification between the party and the government; the decision-making process in the Organisation became centralized and all the powers were vested in her; no ideological debate or dissent in the Organisation - one of the prominent features of the party earlier - was allowed and, lastly the very core of democracy of the party was destroyed and it came to be totally identified with her.From 1973 onwards, Indira Gandhi began to lose her popularity and credibility due to: a Nationwide dropped in 1971, 1972 and 1973; international inflation; and the strike of the railway workers and the Jayaprakash Narayan movement in 1974; and, finally the decision of the Allahbad High Court against her in June 1975. Adamantly, she found herself placed in a situation where imposition of emergency (on 26 June 1975) was the only way to keep things under control.Imposition of emergency of and consider them notoriety because in its grab many act of cities are committed by Indira Gandhi, Sanjay Gandhi, her son and some of their ardent followers. The situation and logic resulted in the rise of Jayaprakash Narayan whose charismatic leadership helped in mobilizing the masses. He succeeded in overthrowing the Congress regime and in installing the Janata party - an "absorbing party" to use Sartori's phrase. Maulana Abdullah Bukhari, the Shahi Imam of Jama Masjid, considered the victory of the Janata party a triumph of Hindu-Muslim unity. The defeat of the Congress meant the end of oppression. In this election the caste consideration, due to popular reaction to the emergency depression, was relegated to the background, and the masses united to fight against Indira Gandhi's authoritarianism. The Janata victory, as it can all agree, reflected not simply the consolidation of the opposition vote, but a substantial shift away from the Congress.Second Coalition Model (1977-1979)The fourth phase is the face of bipartisan technology. For the first time in India a two-party system appeared and it was in existence from 1977 to 1979 when only two parties - the Janata and the Congress - accounted for over 80% of warts and seats back together. The political system dominated by one person prior to 1977 was replaced by collective leadership of the new party where bargaining once again became a prominent feature of politics. This verdict of 1977 also brought to the fore the North-south division, which called for a deft handling so as to ensure that the nation-building process was not hampered. Thus, a new tendency developed in 1977 - a tendency to words a two-party system. Had this trend continued, the two-party system would have prevailed in India. But the developments of 1979 for the club on it. Election results reflected the incapacity of the masses to endure atrocities beyond a certain limit. But soon cynical squabblings among the 'big-three' with criticism of Indira Gandhi as the only item on their agenda made the party lose popularity. According to one observer, the reason for the breakup of the Janata party was the absence of the spirit of compromise. Another observer holds that the over-ambitious attitude of some individuals, temperamental incompatibilities and the party's failure to appear to the people responsible for the split in the Janata Party.Most of the squabbles within the Janata party had not arisen over the grand philosophical themes which are reported in the western press - the Gandhian vision of the self sufficient village, "small is beautiful", etc., But over the distribution of what Indians call, "loaves and fishes". This feuding which Morarji desai's described as a "foul stench" weakened the party in two ways. First, difference over which of the many interest groups within the party should be accorded priority widened the gaps among Janata factions. second, these disputes weakened their rapport between the national and state levels in respect of both the party and the political system. The factions which dominated the Janata party in the national parliament were antagonistic to those which had an upper hand in several key Janata-control and state legislatures.The most pervasive and crucial issue that brought the downfall of the Janata government in 1979 was the dual membership of the erstwhile Jan Sangh members in the Janata party who also had affiliations with. the RSS. The parties forming the coalition government other than the Jan Sangh raised this issue to the embarrassment of the Jan Sangh. The Jan Sangh members persisted in their pride of having affiliations with both - the Jan sangh, as a political party and the RSS, as a cultural organization. Under no circumstances - even if they were due to an relinquish power - one day prepared to snap this bond. Moreover, absence of a strong leadership was also one of the reasons for the failure of the party. Morarji Desai could not hold the party together. And the emergence of two-party system was merely an outcome of specific circumstances and a matter of mutual convenience. As a result, Indira Gandhi return to power in 1980 elections with a bang. Negative voting, massive expenditure and basing the campaign on shrewd caste calculations at the time of distribution of tickets contributed a great deal to the comeback of Indira Gandhi government who gave the slogan: "government that works". The 1980 elections the alleged believed, apart from the fact of polarization of forces between the Congress (I) on the one hand and the left forces on the other, the social political dynamics of the Indian Society. The victory of Indira Gandhi in the election to the seventh Lok Sabha is attributed to the solid support extended by the minorities all over the country. The fragmentation of the opposition resulted in massive parliamentary majorities for Congress despite its having secured marginally over 40% votes.The "Indira factor" was a major reason for both Congress (I)'s Debackle (in 1977) and its comeback with a huge majority (in 1980). By drawing seven or 8% of the electorate (more secure by Congress(I) increased from 35% in 1977 to about 42.5% in 1980) out of their prior group attachments, Indira Gandhi provided their margin needed to assure success to one-party across a broad spectrum of constituencies. While agreeing that "Indira factor" was important in determining the outcome of the elections, Harold A. Gould feels that the split in the Janata Party was no less important.Third One-Party Dominance Model (1980-1989)The fifth phase of the systems may be called that Indira Gandhi and Rajeev Gandhi phase of Congress restoration. The fall of the Janata government believed to be for an astounding victory for the Congress at the polls and the election of Indira Gandhi as the Prime Minister. Having a Zealand this office, she adopted the same old style and placing total reliance on a small coterie, extensive use of media for personality projection, and deffering of organizational elections in the party. Perhaps after what transpired in 1977, Indira Gandhi lost faith in the support which the government consistently received from the minorities. Her actions now seemed to be calculated ones, aiming at presenting her as a leader who was genuinely concerned about the welfare of the Hindus. Some went to the extent of saying that she had stripped the saffron robes of the BJP, leaving it thoroughly exposed. The fact that she won seats in Jammu, where the Hindus are in a majority, and lost heavily in Kashmir valley, where Muslims are a majority lends credibility to this hypothesis.Some may say that 1980 election restored the validate the of the Kothari-Morris Jones Model, though with a difference. In the 1980s, there was an increasing tendency towards a multiparty system which became evident from the fact despite the role of Congress at the center, new opposition parties will be established in the states. After 1980, these started splitting away from the center. The multiparty tendency was further enforced as the years rolled by. In 1983, the Congress lost hold in Karnataka and Andhra Pradesh. Sikkim too was lost and so was Punjab and, towards the closing years of 1980s, nearly half of the states of Indian union select out of the hands of the Congress. And, finally in the 1984 elections, Rajiv Gandhi got unprecedented mandate mainly on account of fort is known as "sympathy vote". To a certain extent his personal image too (of "Mr. Clean" and "scientific man" who would take India to the 21st century) played its part. The new leader raised new hopes and inspired the youth.Marred by a tactic decision-making, false starts, public scandals, and successive Debackles, his style of functioning is said to be an anticlimax to the charismatic bearing of the Nehru dynasty. Rajeev had a massive mandate to prove his worth as a rightful heir of the Nehru dynasty which had shaped India's post independence destiny, but lacking both in farsightedness of Nehru and the firmness of Indira, he seemed to have missed the historic opportunity to make his mark. Indira too had to encounter dramatic ups and downs and was out of favor of it the people for sometime. Nevertheless, her tenacity was a great redeemer and she re-emerged from political disgrace with an honorable acquittal by the electorate. Rajeev's predicament was unlike his mother - his decline does not reflect an "emotional break" with the masses but a "relational rejection" facilitated by poor performance. The "leadership card" has always paid rich dividends to the Congress but it seemed to have proved otherwise in the wake of growing distrust in Gandhi's leadership qualities. He may well be the one to have presided over the "liquidation of the Congress empire".He had earned considerable goodwill by initiating peace process is in trouble spots like Punjab and Assam. His preference for settlement of political disputes through negotiations rather than armed conflict was well known. He was also given credit for greater tolerance of dissent for clean politics. But his honeymoon with democratic functioning was brief; he was so overwhelmed by the establishment and slipped into authoritarian grooves. His peace initiatives had backfired. The Punjab accord was violated with the purpose of securing electoral gains in Haryana, but the Congress lost credibility in both the states. In Assam too his failure to abide by commitments had turned a good effort counterproductive. Apart from the enduring seek insurgency, which defied with impunity, the two year-old president's rule in Punjab was imposed by Rajeev to "combat terrorism". The simmering unrest in Kahmir had grown into an uprising. In terms of electoral politics, the Sikhs in Punjab and the Kashmiri Muslims were not to be a significant factor, but Rajeev government's inability to restore normalcy in these to trouble spots was a fallout on national politics. His second term was thus marked by disillusionment.After an initial flash of sympathy which expressed itself in stupendous victory of the Congress in the 1985 general elections, the sheen of the so called "Mr. Clean" started wearing thin - his governance was marred with corruption at the highest level. Scandals like Bofors burst out with all of intensity. He played the Muslim card by modifying the Shah Bano judgment, and finally the Hindu card by permitting shilanayas at the disputed site. He enrolled with the help of his coterie as if he the presiding over a personal fief. Thus, Rajeev was condemned both for offending vested interests and for so called "blunders of judgment" committed by him.Rajiv Gandhi failed to accomplish the three basic tasks of the Indian state: maintenance of law and order in a sharply divided society; playing of the positive role in facilitating economic growth in an economy with a high saving rate, skin and managerial and technical personnel, and promising entrepreneurial talent; and coping with an uncertain International Security environment.Multiparty System (1989 Onwards to Date)The elections of 1989 were held in an environment charged with the motions variously aroused by the anticorruption campaign, murder of Mrs. Gandhi, the Sikh riots, and terrorist threats to national unity and integrity. In spite of the disturbed at most feared, imposition of emergency was totally ruled out because of beta experience in the past which resulted in the overthrow of Indira Gandhi's government. However, restlessness among the people was growing fast and factors like poor leadership, sycophancy, personality cult, and abuse of the media for highlighting the sacrifices of one family to the total negligence of other equally illustrious leaders aroused and the government sentiments among the masses.Besides Borfors, the concealing of the Thakkar commission report from the parliament, and the subsequent reinstatement of the key man pointed to the commission's reports, institution of enquiry into the assassination of the prime minister after lapse of five years, and some such acts put to serious question mark on the Bona Fides of the government.Over the last 40 years vain promises of clean and efficient administration left the people disillusioned. Widespread indiscipline and rampant corruption had become the order of the day. Rajiv Gandhi's faith in the men at the helm to control the situation was totally belied. Other factors such as rising prices left the people with no other option but to seek an electorate remedy through democratic means. Chief feature of the ninth Lok Sabha elections was that there would no communal basis of factors. Struggle for democracy in India would have to be a struggle against so do secularism and minority appeasement policies.Even though regional identities meant backwardness, stagnation, obscurantism and even incipient separatism, ironically, for the second time, it was this out that saved the Congress from near extinction. In 1977, and again in 1989.The myth of the North-south divide was demolished by the SITA factor ( Singh is the Alternative) which countered the TINA (there is no alternative to Rajiv) factor, within a matter of just two years.One Rajeev's managers believed that negative campaigning was best strategy, V.P. Singh remained in touch with people. Absence of Inter-party democracy caused the downfall of the Congress.The opposition unity index was the true indicator of and the Congress and the total swing. The Janata Dal of V.P. Singh attracted widespread support throughout Northern India. The fact that he himself belonged to the north increased his party's appeal. Men elections were called for in November 1989, the national front, the BJP and left formed an alliance in some 400 constituencies to select one opposition candidate face the Congress(I) candidate in a street fight, as to ensure that the opposition votes did not split.To sum up, Federal coalition governments in India have by now come of age. Initially to test it like playing the Indian experiment suggests that given a serious attempt and reforms, coalition governments can in fact contributes to a more democratic and Federal governance.There u hav it :Du hav any oder doubts? mail me.. cyclotron_girl@yahoo.co.inu hav any oder doubts? mail me.. cyclotron_girl@yahoo.co.in
5000jugoslavija dinara currency in indian rupee
no
USA dollar, Indian rupee.
Type your answer here... pakistan currency
jugoslavije currency in 100000 dinars how much in indian rupee
0.53 ps (Indian Rupee) as on 15-05-2012
currency cunvert to Indian rupee 50000000000 jugoslavije dinara convert to Indian rupees
i dinar = 0.118370 indian rupee and 500 dinars =19.1850 rupees
Hrvatska is Croatian for Croatia. The form of money they use is the Kuna. 50000 Kuna is equal to 525564 Indian Rupees.
i have some jugoslavijia currency 5000000 of the year 1993. how to sell tha dinara in Indian rupee
5000jugoslavija dinara currency in indian rupee
Indian currency is Rupee (Re).