What was the dilemma faced by the US Supreme Court when deciding the case of Marbury v. Madison?

Answer 1

Background

John Adams, a Federalist, won the Presidential election in 1796. Thomas Jefferson, a Democratic-Republic, won the Vice-Presidency. The Federalists controlled both the executive and legislative branches at that time. By the next election, in 1800, Federalist policies had angered enough people that Adams lost the election badly.

Thomas Jefferson and Aaron Burr, both Democratic-Republicans, received an equal number of electoral votes, so the final decision as to who would assume which role fell to the House of Representatives. Jefferson, championed by a popular Alexander Hamilton, won the Presidency. With both Presidential and Vice-Presidential offices filled by Democratic-Republicans, as well as the majority of seats in both the House and Senate, the new administration portended a radical shift in the government's ideology.

Before the new administration could take office, however, the Sixth Congress passed two pieces of legislation in early 1801 that expanded the federal court system. The first, The Judiciary Act of 1801, which passed February 13, 1801, reduced the size of the Supreme Court from 6 members to 5, by attrition, to impede Jefferson's ability to change the composition of the Court (which was entirely Federalist at that time). It also relieved the Justices of their "circuit riding" responsibilities, reorganizing the lower courts into six circuits, and creating positions for 16 new judges.

The second piece of legislation, the Organic Act of 1801 (aka "An Act Concerning the District of Columbia"), which passed on February 27, 1801, is more directly relevant to the Marbury v. Madison case. In the Organic Act, Congress formally incorporated land ceded to the federal government by Virginia and Maryland into the District of Columbia, dividing the territory into two "cities": Alexandria, which operated under Virginia law; and Georgetown, which operated under Maryland law. This created a number of lower-level judicial positions (the most commonly referenced number is 42), including "...such number of discreet persons to be justices of the peace, as the President of the United States shall from time to time think expedient."

The out-going President, John Adams, in a desperate attempt to bolster Federalist influence, quickly appointed 42 members of his own party to the justice of the peace positions, and 16 Federalist judges to head the Circuit courts created by the new Judiciary Act of 1801 (passed on February 13, 1801). These later became known as the "Midnight Judges," after the fact that they were nominated March 2, and confirmed by the Senate on March 3, 1801, Adams' final day in office.

John Marshall, who was Secretary of State under Adams, was responsible for completing the paperwork and delivering the official "commissions" to each of the newly appointed judges, but the administration ended before he could undertake this task. Adams "Midnight Judges" were nominated on March 2, 1801 and confirmed by the Senate on March 3, 1801. Although Marshall worked late into the night completing the registration of appointments and affixing the official Presidential seal, there was no time for Marshall to deliver the paperwork before he and Adams left office on March 4.

Marshall, himself, had been newly confirmed as Chief Justice of the Supreme Court (February 4, 1801), but agreed to remain in office as Secretary of State until the administration changed.

When Thomas Jefferson was elected President in 1800, there were no members of his party in the federal judiciary (not surprising because the Democratic-Republican party had formed only recently from a group formerly known as the Anti-federalists). In fact, virtually the entire judiciary, including every member of the Supreme Court, was Federalist, a legacy of both John Adams and George Washington. Jefferson decided to take corrective measures.

First, he reduced the number of justice of the peace appointments from 42 to 30, ostensibly as a matter of economy. Of the remaining 30 appointments, Jefferson allowed 25 Federalist appointees to keep their positions, and nominated members of his own party to fill the remaining five slots.

William Marbury, whom Adams had appointed justice of the peace for the District of Columbia, was one of the 12 whose commissions were eliminated.

After waiting in vain Marbury decided to seek actions from the courts. Searching through statute books, he came across Section 13 of the Judiciary Act of 1789, which authorized the Supreme Court "to issue writs of mandamus." A writ of mandamus is a court order directing an official, such as Secretary of State, to perform a duty about which the official has no discretion, such as delivering a commission.

Dilemma

This action put newly appointed chief justice Marshall in the position to make a decision. On the one hand, if he sided with Marbury, then Madison would most likely ignore such a decision. The court would be powerless and its prestige, already low, would suffer a fatal blow.

Marshall tested this theory by issuing an order requiring an explanation from Madison as to why Marshall should not issue a writ of mandamus. Madison ignored the order, an insult to the judiciary, which was being treated as a less-than-equal branch of the new government.

On the other hand, by refusing to issue the writ, the judges would appear to support President Jefferson and the Republicans.

On February 24, 1803, The Supreme Court delivered its opinion. The first part was as expected. Marbury was entitled to his commission and Madison should deliver it to him.

Then came the surprise, Marshall stated that Section 13 is contrary to Article III of the constitution, and went on to explained why the court has no jurisdiction to enforce an unconstitutional law. Marshall gained the much more important power to declare laws passed by Congress unconstitutional. It was a brilliant move.

Case Citation:

Marbury v. Madison, 5 US 137 (1803)

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