* The hypothesis is that the German General Staff deliberately urged Austria-Hungary to act unreasonably following the assassination in Sarajevo. They did not want Germany to be seen to start the war itself and therefore encourage Austria-Hungary to do so by proxy, so to speak. The key device was the 'blank check' given to Austria-Hungary pledging unconditional support. * In Austria-Hungary there were 'doves' as well as 'hawks'. When Serbia accepted most of the demands in the Austro-Hungarian ultimatum, the doves nearly carried the day. Faced with the prospect of a peaceful resolution of the crisis, the horror of the German General Staff knew no bounds, and they immediately used all their influence to strengthen the position of the 'hawks' in Vienna. * All this is well documented in the German and Austrian archives. It is not some fanciful theory. * What's more, a meeting of the German General Staff in December 1912 had resolved in principle to use the next suitable European crisis to go to war. The real target was Russia, but fighting Russia involved knocking out France first. The meeting was called without Chancellor Bethmann Hollweg (or any politician) present as it was feared that they would urge caution. * The German Ambassador in London, Lichnowsky, was warned unambiguously by the Foreign Secretary, Sir Edward Grey, that if the German Army invaded Belgium, Britain would go to war. Lichnowsky telegraphed Berlin at once but his telegram was ignored. On many German websites most of this is presented as conventional wisdom, even accepted fact. To avoid misunderstanding it should be said that Fritz Fischer has always stressed that he doesn't support the "war guilt clause" (Article 231) of the Treaty of Versailles, which in effect treated every German man, woman and child as responsible. He blames very small cliques which even the government didn't have under effective control. Perhaps the main criticism of Fritz Fischer's hypothesis is that he underestimates the role of the underlying background tensions, rivalries and conflicts. There is an ongoing controversy, but the 'mechanics' of Fischer's analysis are very hard to contradict.
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Fritz Fischer's book Griff nach der Weltmacht was published in 1961. At first it was greeted with acclaim in the media.However, the revelations came as a shock to the public and to professional historians. Moreover, Fischer had documented his claims very well. In Germany there had been an unspoken (and very unsatisfactory, not to say shabby) understanding that Germany accepted responsibility for the outbreak of World War 2 provided that it wasn't held responsible for World War 1.It took a while for the full implications of Fischer's views to become apparent. The obvious implication of the view that Germany had caused both World Wars was that somewhere Germany had gone off the rails ... or even worse, that there was something odd or even pathological about its development. Off course, other historians examined the documents - and to their horror they found that the situation was much as Fischer had said and all that they could make were changes in emphasis and some minor modifications.
The 1939 invasion of Poland caused Britain to declare war on Germany, which started WWII.
World War II officially began after Germany invaded Poland. The invasion of Poland caused England and France to declare war on Germany.
Germany had to surrender because the allies were all in Germany their economy was basically destroyed and the Russians were in Berlin and Hitler had committed suicide so they had no leader
Germany